Blind post-processing for the unbalanced BB84 by Sunohara, Satoshi et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
30
2.
17
01
v2
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  8
 Fe
b 2
01
3
Blind post-processing for the unbalanced BB84
Satoshi Sunohara1,∗ Kiyoshi Tamaki2,3,† and Nobuyuki Imoto1‡
1Division of Materials Physics, Graduate School of Engineering Science,Osaka University,
1-3 Machikaneyama, Toyonaka, Osaka 560-8531, Japan
2NTT Basic Research Laboratories, NTT Corporation,
3-1,Morinosato Wakamiya Atsugi-Shi, Kanagawa, 243-0198, Japan
3National Institute of Information and Communications Technology,
4-2-1 Nukui-Kita, Koganei, Tokyo 184-8795, Japan
For the realization of quantum key distribution, it is important to investigate its security based
on a mathematical model that captures properties of the actual devices used by the legitimate users.
Recently, Ferenczi, et. al. (Phys. Rev. A 86 042327 (2012)) pointed out potential influences that
the losses in phase modulators and/or the unbalance in the transmission rate of beam splitters may
have on the security of the phase-encoded BB84 and analyzed the security of this scheme, which is
called the unbalanced BB84. In this paper, we ask whether blindly applying the post-processing of
the balanced BB84 to the unbalanced BB84 would lead to an insecure key or not, and we conclude
that we can safely distill a secure key even with this post-processing. It follows from our proof that
as long as the unbalances are basis-independent, our conclusion holds even if the unbalances are
unknown and fluctuate in time.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a protocol to share
the secret key between two authenticate parties (Alice
and Bob) with negligible leakage of its information to an
eavesdropper (Eve). The advantage of employing QKD
is that it can achieve the unconditional security, which
is the security against any possible attack allowed by the
law of quantum mechanics under some assumptions on
the devices used by Alice and Bob.
The first QKD protocol was proposed by Bennett and
Brassard at 1984 [1] (the protocol is called BB84 proto-
col). Since this proposal, many works have been devoted
to prove the unconditional security [2–7], and some works
take into account practical imperfections of the devices
used by Alice and Bob [8–10]. It is important that a
mathematical model of Alice and Bob’s devices is needed
to prove the security of a QKD protocol, and thus the
model should reflect the actual imperfections of the de-
vices for the realization.
In this paper, we consider the effect of the losses in
phase modulators and the unbalance in the transmission
rate of beam splitters in the phase encoded BB84. This
practical imperfection is firstly pointed out by Ferenczi,
et. al. [11], and this scheme is referred to as the un-
balanced BB84. Since the actual phase modulators have
inevitable losses and the transmission rate of actual beam
splitters cannot be exactly 50%, it is important to ana-
lyze the security of the protocol in order to fit the theory
to the actual situation. The security of this protocol has
been analyzed by Ferenczi, et. al. [11] based on the se-
curity proof [12, 13]. In their proof, however, it is not
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clear whether blindly applying the post-processing for
the standard (balanced) BB84 would lead to an insecure
key or not.
The purpose of this paper is to provide the uncondi-
tional security proof of the unbalanced BB84 by showing
that any security proof of the balanced BB84 where Eve is
allowed to distribute Alice and Bob a basis-independent
state, for instance the security proof based on comple-
mentary scenario [5] or Shor-Preskill type proof [4], can
be directly applied to the unbalanced BB84. This means
that we can safely perform the data processing for the
key distillation as if there were no unbalance and the
unbalance only changes experimental data. Moreover, a
natural consequence of our security proof is that as long
as the unbalances are basis-independent, our conclusion
holds even if the unbalance in Alice and Bob is unknown
and fluctuate in time.
In order to see the performance of the unbalanced
BB84, we simulate the resulting key generation rate as a
function of the distance between Alice and Bob. Follow-
ing the work by Ferenczi, et. al., we consider two cases:
the first case is that we employ the unbalanced BB84
as it is and the second one is that we apply additional
attenuations to Alice and Bob’s devices in order to bal-
ance the intensities of the double pulses and to eliminate
the effect of the unbalance in Bob’s measurement. We
call the second case as the BB84 with the hardware fix
or the hardware fix scenario, and this case is essentially
the same as standard BB84 with additional losses. By
simulating the key generation rates for the two cases, we
have obtained almost the same threshold distance of the
key generation in [11] and confirmed that the key rate of
the BB84 with the hardware fix is lower than that of the
unbalanced BB84 [11].
The organization of this paper is as follows, In Sec. II,
we briefly review the protocol of the unbalanced BB84.
In Sec. III, we first briefly review the security proof of the
balanced BB84 and prove the unconditional security of
2the unbalanced BB84. In Sec. IV, by assuming the use of
the decoy state [14], we simulate the key generation rates
of the unbalanced BB84 and the BB84 with the hardware
fix. The key rates are plotted as a function of the distance
between Alice and Bob by taking experimental data from
GYS experiment [15]. Finally, we summarize this paper
in Sec. V.
II. UNBALANCED BB84
In this section, we introduce the unbalanced BB84.
The experimental setup of the unbalanced BB84 is de-
picted in FIG. 1. The unbalanced BB84 is the standard
phase encoded BB84 protocol using phase randomized
weak coherent pulses where the intensities of the double
pulses are not the same because of the imperfections of
the phase modulators and/or the beam splitters. For the
simplicity of the discussion, we assume that the phase
modulators possessed by Alice and Bob have the same
transmission rate κ and we do not explicitly consider the
unbalance of the beam splitters, i.e., all the relevant beam
splitters are assumed to have 50% of transmission rate,
but the generalization of our analysis is trivial.
In Alice’s side, a phase randomized coherent pulse from
her laser source splits into two arms A1 and A2 by a bal-
anced beam splitter BS1. Alice randomly applies phase
modulation θ = {0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2} to the pulse passing
A1 by the imperfect phase modulator PMA. Here, the
phase θ = {0, pi} ({pi/2, 3pi/2}) is defined as the bit value
{0, 1} in X (Y ) basis (for the later convenience, we use
W = X,Y to refer the basis). The pair of the pluses
come from A1 and A2 is sent to Bob via another bal-
anced beam splitter BS2. Because of the imperfection
of PMA, the state of the pulses sent by Alice becomes
|ei(ζ+θ)√κα〉s|eiζ
√
α〉r, where subscripts s and r respec-
tively denote the signal pulse passed through A1 and ref-
erence pulse passed through A2, and ζ is the random
phase chosen between 0 and 2pi.
FIG. 1: Description of our model of the unbalanced BB84
protocol. PMA and PMB are the lossy phase modulators
with the transmission rate of κ. Note that our proof is valid
even if the unbalances in Alice and Bob’s sides are different
and unknown.
In Bob’s side, the optical length difference between
B1 and B2 is adjusted to the same as the one between
A1 and A2. Thanks to his interferometer, the pair of
the incoming pulses is finally separated into three pulses
which can be distinguished by the detection time of the
detectors, and we only consider the pulses arriving at
the intermediate time. Bob applies the phase modula-
tion φ randomly chosen from {0, pi/2} to the pulse pass-
ing through B1 by the imperfect phase modulator PMB.
Here, the phase modulation 0 (pi/2) is defined as X (Y )
basis in Bob’s measurement. As the result of Bob’s phase
modulation, the state of the pulses arriving at the beam
splitter BS4 becomes |ei(ζ+θ)√κβ〉s|ei(ζ+φ)
√
κβ〉r, and
state at the detector D0 (D1) becomes |eiζ eiφ+eiθ√
2
√
κβ〉(
|eiζ eiφ−eiθ√
2
√
κβ〉
)
. Bob records the bit value 0 (1) when
D0 (D1) clicks, and Bob randomly assigns a random bit
to the double click event if the double click event occurs
due to noises such as the dark counting of the detectors
or misalignment. After Bob’s measurement, Bob broad-
casts his basis, and Alice and Bob keep the data with
the bases matched. One can see that Bob can obtain the
same bit value with Alice when there are no noises.
We note that we make the following assumption on
Bob’s detection device: the POVM element Fˆ
(f)
W corre-
sponding to the failure detection of the bit value in W
basis is basis-independent, i.e.,
Fˆ
(f)
X = Fˆ
(f)
Y . (1)
Therefore, we consider Bob’s W basis measurement is
constructed by a basis-independent filter FˆBob followed
by Bob’s two-outcome, i.e., Bobs bit value, W basis
measurement MˆW . We note that the squash model
[10, 16, 17] is not necessary in our proof.
We remark that since each of the signal and reference
pulses of our interest passes through the phase modulator
only once, we do not need to equalize the intensities of
the pulses in order to suppress the bit errors. However,
just for the comparison, we consider the case where we fix
the unbalance by implementing the beam splitters with
the transmission rate of κ to the paths of A2 and B2
(see also FIG. 2). We call this scenario as the BB84 with
hardware fix or the hardware fix scenario, and we can
regard this case as the ideal BB84 with the additional
attenuation. We will compare the key generation rates
of both of the cases by the key generation simulations
in Sec. IV, and we confirm that the unbalanced BB84
protocol has larger key generation rate than the BB84
with the hardware fix.
III. SECURITY PROOF
In this section, we prove the unconditional security of
the unbalanced BB84 protocol based on complementar-
ity scenario [5]. We consider only the single-photon part
(n = 1) since we may not be able to or may have very lit-
tle chance to generate the key frommulti-photon part due
to the so-called photon-number splitting (PNS) attacks
3FIG. 2: (a) is the interferometer in the unbalanced BB84.
(b) is the interferometer for the BB84 with the hardware fix.
In (a) and (b), the loss in the phase modulator is modeled
by the additional beam splitters with the reflection rate of
1 − κ preceded by the lossless phase modulator (PM). (b) is
equivalent to (c).
[18]. In order to treat the photon number separately,
we apply the argument by GLLP [10] or by Koashi [19].
For the simplicity of the discussion, we assume that the
key is generated from the states of X basis, and there-
fore the states of Y basis are only spent in the parameter
estimation, i.e., the so-called phase error estimation.
A. The state of Alice and the brief review of the
security proof of the balanced BB84
Before the proof, we would like to discuss Alice’s
source. Thanks to the phase randomization, the density
matrix of the pulses sent by Alice becomes the mixture
of the eigenstates of the photon number n (we rewrite
the eigenstates as |a(n)W 〉B) as follows
∫ 2pi
0
dζ
2pi
Pˆ (|ei(ζ+θ)√κα〉s|eiζ
√
α〉r) =
∞∑
n=0
p(n)Pˆ (|a(n)W 〉B)
(2)
where W ∈ {X,Y } and a ∈ {0, 1} are the basis and
bit value Alice chooses for sending the pulses (W and
a in right-hand side corresponds to θ in the left-hand
side), Pˆ is defined as Pˆ (|ψ〉) = |ψ〉〈ψ|, and the sub-
script B represents the system to be sent to Bob. The
single-photon part (n = 1) of |a(n)W 〉B is described as
|a(1)X 〉B = 1√1+κ (|0Z〉B + (−1)a
√
κ|1Z〉B) and |a(1)Y 〉B =
1√
1+κ
(e−i
pi
4 |0Z〉B + (−1)a
√
κei
pi
4 |1Z〉B), where we define
|0Z〉B = |0〉s|1〉r and |1Z〉B = |1〉s|0〉r. For the later con-
venience, we define the relationships of the eigenstates of
qubit states as follows: |jX〉 = 1√2 (|0Z〉+(−1)j|1Z〉) and
|jY 〉 = 1√2 (e−i
pi
4 |0Z〉+ (−1)jeipi4 |1Z〉) where j = 0, 1.
In the following two paragraphs, we briefly review the
essential point of the security proof of the balanced BB84.
In GLLP argument [10] or the argument by Koashi in
[19], we ask whether the privacy amplification succeeds if
it is applied only to the qubits associated with the single-
photon emission, and it is shown that we can generate
the secret key with asymptotic key generation rate R as
follow [20].
R = −γXf(EX)h(EX) + γ(1)X [1− h(e
′(1)
Y )] . (3)
Here, e
′(1)
Y is Y basis fictitious bit error rate that would
have been obtained if Alice had sent a single-photon in
X basis and Alice and Bob had employed Y basis for
the measurement, EX is the bit error rate from the X
basis measurements when Alice sends a pulse in X basis,
γX is the rate of Bob’s detection in X basis (γ
(1)
X is the
part of γX where Alice sends a single photon), f(EX) is
the inefficiency of the error correcting code, and h(x) =
−x log2 x− (1− x) log2(1− x).
Note that what the actual experiment gives Alice and
Bob is the bit error rate in Y basis EY when Bob chooses
Y basis and Alice sends a pulse in Y basis rather than
a single-photon in X basis. By using GLLP argument
or combining GLLP argument with the decoy state idea
[14], we can estimate the lower bound of e
(1)
Y , which is
the contribution from Alice’s single-photon emission in
EY , but this quantity is different from e
′(1)
Y . In the bal-
anced BB84, it turns out that these quantities match
(e
(1)
Y = e
′(1)
Y ) [3–5]. The most important point to derive
e
(1)
Y = e
′(1)
Y in the balanced BB84 is the basis indepen-
dence of the state Alice prepares and of Bob’s detection
Eq. (1). Thanks to this independence, Eve cannot be-
have differently between X and Y basis so that we have
e
(1)
Y = e
′(1)
Y [7, 10, 14, 19]. In what follows, we prove that
e
(1)
Y = e
′(1)
Y is also the case for the unbalanced BB84,
which means that we can perform the data processing in
the unbalanced BB84 as if there were no unbalance.
B. Security proof of the unbalanced BB84
For the security proof, we first consider a virtual pro-
tocol where we change the method to determine Alice’s
bit value a. In the virtual protocol, she firstly generates
|Ψ+(n)W 〉AB with the probability p(n)
|Ψ+(n)W 〉AB =
1√
2
(|0W 〉A|0(n)W 〉B − |1W 〉A|1(n)W 〉B) (4)
where the subscripts A and B respectively denote Alice’s
and Bob’s system, which is mathematically expressed by
Hilbert space HA
⊗
HB. After generating the state, she
conducts W basis measurement on her qubit, and she
4records the measurement outcome as her bit value a in
W basis. Finally, she sends the system B to Bob. We can
confirm the state sent to Bob is equivalent to the actual
protocol. In the virtual protocol, it does not matter if
Alice delays her measurement after sending the state,
and hence we assume this delay hereafter.
From the definition of |Ψ+(1)X 〉AB and |Ψ+(1)Y 〉AB , one
can easily confirm that |Ψ+(1)X 〉AB = |Ψ+(1)Y 〉AB , i.e.,
the state of the single-photon in the virtual protocol is
basis-independent. By combining this independence with
the basis-independence of Bob’s measurement, we have
e
(1)
Y = e
′(1)
Y . This ends the proof.
As an alternative proof (also see FIG. 3), we further-
more modify the single-photon part of the virtual pro-
tocol that is equivalent to the single photon part of the
unbalanced BB84 protocol. Let FˆAlice =
√
κ|0Z〉A〈0Z |+
|1Z〉A〈1Z | be Kraus operator corresponding to the suc-
cessful event of her filtering operation. In the modified
protocol, Alice first prepares a basis-independent joint
state |Ψ+〉AB = 1√2 (|0Z〉A|1Z〉B+ |1Z〉A|0Z〉B), performs
the filtering operation, and then she keeps only the suc-
cessfully filtered state. We can confirm that the fil-
tered state satisfies FˆAlice ⊗ 1ˆB|Ψ+〉AB ∝ |Ψ+(1)X 〉AB =
|Ψ+(1)Y 〉AB, which means that the post-selected state is
also basis-independent. This ends the alternative proof.
In summary, we can prove the security of the unbal-
anced BB84 protocol by directly confirming the basis-
independence |Ψ+(1)X 〉AB = |Ψ+(1)Y 〉AB together with the
basis-independence of Bob’s measurement. Alternatively,
we consider the virtual protocol for the single-photon
part, which is constructed by the preparation of the Bell
state |Ψ+〉AB = 1√2 (|0Z〉A|1Z〉B + |1Z〉A|0Z〉B) followed
by each side of basis-independent filtering operation with
FˆAlice and FˆBob, the post-selection, and each side of the
two outcome measurements ofW basis. The two outcome
measurements consist of MˆW in Bob’s side and projective
W basis qubit measurement PˆW in Alice’s side (depicted
in FIG. 3). This virtual protocol is composed only by
basis-independent operations so that we have e
(1)
Y = e
′(1)
Y .
From the above discussion, we conclude that the key
generation rate of the unbalanced BB84 protocol is writ-
ten as
R = −γXf(EX)h(EX) + γ(1)X [1− h(e(1)Y )] . (5)
This formula is completely equivalent to the rate of the
balanced BB84 [10, 14, 19]. Therefore, we can perform
the data processing in the unbalanced BB84 as if there
were no unbalance. The unbalance affects only the re-
alization of the experimental data as we will see in the
next section, and it never affects the key formula itself.
We remark that we have used only the basis inde-
pendence of the unbalance in our security proof. Thus,
it follows that as long as the unbalances are basis-
independent, our conclusion holds even if the unbalance
of the sending pulses and that of the measurement are
unknown and fluctuate in time. It also follows that if we
FIG. 3: Description of the virtual protocol for the single-
photon part in our alternative proof. Alice (Bob) conducts
the two outcome measurement of W basis which consists of
PˆW (MˆW ) following the post-selection by each side of the
filters. Note that the filtering operations FˆAlice and FˆBob are
basis-independent, and as a result we can safely apply the
security proof of the standard BB84 to the filtered state.
use the so-called squash operators [10, 16, 17] for Bob’s
measurement satisfying Eq. (1), which is shown to exist
in [11], then one can draw the same conclusion even when
one uses any proof technique of the balanced BB84, in-
cluding Shor-Preskill type security proof [3, 4], where Eve
is regarded as the sender of a basis-independent quantum
state to Alice and Bob.
IV. SIMULATION
In this section, we simulate the key generation rate
by using the typical experimental parameters taken from
the Gobby-Yuan-Shields (GYS) experiments [15]. In the
simulation, we assume the use of infinite number of decoy
states to obtain γ
(1)
X and e
(1)
Y . We also assume that the bit
error only stems from the dark counting of the detectors,
and therefore, we ignore the probability of the error stem-
ming from the misalignment and other imperfections of
the devices. In order to ensure the basis-independent de-
tection (Eq. (1)), we assume that the quantum efficiencies
of the two detectors are the same and the inefficiency of
the detector can be modeled by a beam splitter preceded
by a detector with unit quantum efficiency. Moreover,
we assign a random bit value to the double click event.
With all the assumptions, we may have the following
5experimental data.
η =ηdet10
− ξl
10
β =αη
γX =[1− (1 − pd)e−κβ ](1− pd)
+ (1− pd)e−κβpd + [1− (1− pd)e−κβ]pd
EX ={(1− pd)e−κβpd + 1
2
[1− (1 − pd)e−κβ ]pd}/γX
p(1) =e−(1+κ)αα(1 + κ)
γ
(1)
X ={[1− (1− pd)(1− η
κ
1 + κ
)](1 − pd)
+ (1− pd)(1− η κ
1 + κ
)pd
+ [1− (1− pd)(1− η κ
1 + κ
)]pd}p(1)
e
(1)
Y ={(1− pd)(1− η
κ
1 + κ
)pd
+
1
2
[1− (1 − pd)(1 − η κ
1 + κ
)]pd}p(1)/γ(1)X
(6)
Here, pd is the dark count rate of each of the detector
D0 and D1, η is the overall transmission rate, ηdet is the
quantum efficiency of the detectors D1 and D2, ξ is the
channel transmission rate, and l is the distance between
Alice and Bob.
We also simulate the case of the hardware fix scenario.
In this case, some values of the parameters change as
follows.
γX =[1− (1− pd)e−κ
2β ](1− pd)
+ (1 − pd)e−κ
2βpd + [1− (1− pd)e−κ
2β ]pd
EX ={(1− pd)e−κ
2βpd +
1
2
[1− (1 − pd)e−κ
2β ]pd}/γX
p(1) =e−2κα2κα
γ
(1)
X ={[1− (1 − pd)(1 −
ηκ
2
)](1− pd)
+ (1 − pd)(1 − ηκ
2
)pd
+ [1− (1 − pd)(1 − ηκ
2
)]pd}p(0)
e
(1)
Y ={(1− pd)(1 −
ηκ
2
)pd
+
1
2
[1− (1− pd)(1− ηκ
2
)]pd}p(1)/γ(1)X
(7)
We take the following parameters from the GYS ex-
periments [15]: f(EX) = 1.22, pd = 8.5 × 10−7, ξ =
0.21[dB/km], and ηdet = 0.045. The result of the simu-
lation is shown in FIG. 4 where we have optimized the
intensity of the pulse (α), and the optimum intensity is
depicted in FIG. 5. We obtain almost the same transmis-
sion distances as those in [11]. Furthermore, we can con-
firm that the hardware fix scenario causes the decrease
in the key generation rate (the same tendency is also
obtained by the work by Ferenczi, et. al. [11]). This
decrease is due to the additional loss in the hardware fix
scenario.
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FIG. 4: Key generation rates of the unbalanced BB84. The
thick line is a ideal phase encoded BB84 (κ = 1), the thin
line is the unbalanced BB84 (κ = 1/2), and dashed line is the
BB84 with the hardware fix (κ = 1/2).
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FIG. 5: Optimal intensity α that results in each of the opti-
mal key generation rate in FIG. 4.
V. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
In summary, we have proved the unconditional security
of the unbalanced BB84 protocol. For the security proof,
we have considered the virtual protocol that is equiva-
lent to the unbalanced BB84 protocol. In the proof, we
have confirmed that the single photon part of the virtual
protocol is basis-independent or this part is constructed
by the preparation of the Bell state followed by each side
of the basis-independent filtering operations, and each
side of the two outcome measurements. Thanks to the
basis-independence in the virtual protocol, we have con-
cluded that we can apply the method of security proofs of
6the balanced BB84 [3–5]. Therefore, we can conduct the
data processing for the key distillation as if there were no
unbalance and the unbalance has influence only through
the realization of the experimental data. We note that a
natural consequence of our security proof is that as long
as the unbalances are basis-independent, our conclusion
holds even if the unbalance of the sending pulses and that
of the measurement are unknown and fluctuate in time.
Finally, by the simulation, we have also compared the
key generation rates of the unbalanced BB84 and the
BB84 with the hardware fix, and confirmed that the
hardware fix scenario causes the decrease in the key gen-
eration rate and the transmission distance.
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